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BROAD POWERS, SILENT INTENTIONS: COMPELLING CLASS ACTION ARBITRATION 
WITHOUT EXPRESS AUTHORIZATION 
 




In a commercial landscape clouded by ever increasing litigation, where court 
dockets are full and the cost of litigation is extensive,
1
 there remains a desperate need for 
a suitable form of alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”).  In the United States, 
arbitration has surfaced as the preferred form of ADR for commercial disputes.  Yet, the 
strength and effectiveness of arbitration rests on the efficacy of this private method of 
adjudication, and specifically, the ability to bind parties to arbitral awards.  In such a 
climate, arbitrators are granted great powers and entrusted to make sound professional 
judgments when rendering decisions.  Recently, however, a circuit split has arisen 
regarding the extent of an arbitrators’ power to compel class arbitration.
2
  This circuit 
court split threatens to destabilize the nature and effectiveness of American arbitration.  
Courts must therefore adopt a clear, effective and consistent approach regarding 
arbitrators’ powers to ensure that the American arbitration system continues to thrive.   
The statute governing arbitration in the United States is the Federal Arbitration 
Act (“FAA”).  The FAA states that a provision in “a contract evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy . . .  shall be valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of 
any contract.”
3
  As this statutory language illustrates, legislators’ intended to ensure the 
arbitration decisions are binding, uncontested, and final. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
also interpreted the FAA as establishing a federal policy favoring arbitration.  In 
accordance with this policy, the Court has consistently resolved ambiguities within 
arbitration clauses in favor of arbitration.
4
  Furthermore, the Court has determined that 
the primary role of the FAA is to make certain that arbitration agreements are enforced 
according to their terms.
5
  Yet, the Court has held that “arbitration is a matter of contract 
and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not 
                                                 
*
 Daivy P. E. Dambreville is a Senior Editor of the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2013 
Juris Doctor Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. The author would 
like to thank Professor Thomas E. Carbonneau for his assistance and sound advice; and his parents, 
Evelyne and Pierre Dambreville, for their constant love and support.  
1
 See Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
668, 669 (1986) (explaining that the need for ADR exists because the cost of litigation has significantly 
increased and a large number of cases are being filed in courts). 
2
 The circuit court split being referred to here is between the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The details of the split will be discussed at length later in the article. 
3
 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
4
 See, e.g., Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989) 
(explaining that  “due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to 
the scope of the arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration”). 
5




agreed so to submit.”
6
  The Supreme Court has since adopted the principle that 
arbitration agreements, like any other contractual agreements, should be enforced in 
accordance with the parties’ intentions.
7
  The evolution of the Court’s reasoning, outlined 
above, has continued to redefine the scope and depth of arbitral powers leading to some 
confusion in lower courts as to the current state of affairs.  
This article will focus on the depths of an arbitrator’s power to compel class 
arbitration
8
 and how this power has been defined, interpreted, and applied in the Third 
and Fifth Circuits in the wake of the Stolt-Nielsen case.  Recent Supreme Court decisions 
regarding class arbitration contain significant discussions regarding the unfairness and 
disadvantages of the procedure.
9
  The Court’s discussions pose the question of whether 
arbitrators can infer consent to class arbitration of disputes arising from multiple, bilateral 
contracts—when each contract contains one common party.
10
  As discussed below, lower 
courts have differed markedly on how they interpret and apply Stolt-Nielsen—the Court’s 
most recent proclamation regarding arbitral powers to compel class arbitration. 
Part II provides a historical framework of the cases in question, delving into the 
facts, court analyses, and briefly discussing the application of their findings.  The circuit 
split between the Third and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal is also identified and 
discussed.  Part III examines the arbitrators’ power to compel class arbitration before and 
after Stolt-Nielsen and discusses how courts have interpreted Stolt-Nielsen. 
I conclude with the assertion that the Third Circuit’s application of Stolt-Nielsen 
is more appropriate because it defers to arbitrators’ decisions as to whether the agreement 
empowers them to compel class arbitration, where the parties have not explicitly stated 
their intentions.  The Fifth Circuit’s application of Stolt-Nielsen empowers the judiciary 
to further infringe on the arbitrator’s domain and ability to effectively conduct arbitration 
proceedings.  Therefore, because the Third Circuit's interpretation gives more deference 
to arbitrators’ professional judgment, this article argues that the Third Circuit's is the 
correct approach to follow. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Issue With Silence: The Stolt-Nielson Case 
In Stolt-Nielson SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., the United States Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of whether an arbitration clause—which is silent regarding class 
                                                 
6
  Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) (quoting United Steelworkers of 
Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)) (emphasis added). 
7
 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1774 (2010). 
8
 In the context of arbitration, the terms “class arbitration” and “class action arbitration” are widely 
used to describe “consolidated arbitration proceedings.” 
9
 See Nicholas Goodrich, Dispensing Injustice: Stolt-Nielsen and Its Implications, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 
197, 205 (2011); see also Ginevra Ventre, The Federal Arbitration Act Preempts A State Law That Renders 
Unconscionable A Class Arbitration Waiver in A Consumer Adhesion Contract Likely to Involve Disputes 
over Small Sums of Money: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 919, 925 (2012). 
10
 Philip J. Loree Jr., More FAA: Why AT&T Mobility Makes Sense—And Why It Likely Isn't the End of 
Class Arbitration, 29 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 145, 155 (2011). 
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arbitration—permits imposing class arbitration on the parties.
11
  The dispute arose when 
AnimalFeeds served the petitioners, collectively Stolt-Nielsen, with a demand of class 
arbitration to resolve various antitrust claims even though the arbitration agreement was 
silent on the issue.
12
  Stolt-Nielsen challenged the class arbitration on the basis that the 
parties had not explicitly agreed to arbitrate antitrust issues.
13
  Ultimately, the Court held 
that parties who have agreed to bilateral arbitration, not class-action arbitration, have to 
consent to resolve their disputes in class proceedings – mere silence in the contract is not 
sufficient.
14
  The Court’s rationale was “that a party may not be compelled under the 
FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that 
the party agreed to do so.”
15
  The lasting effect of this decision has been that courts have 
emphasized the specific nature and language of arbitration agreements to decide whether 
the parties’ disputes are subject to arbitration.   As such, in order to bring forth a claim 
under the FAA, each party must have agreed to arbitrate the issue of class arbitration in 
the arbitration agreement or subsequently consented to resolve the matter as a class 
arbitration. 
B. Our Powers Must Be Broad: The Sutter Case 
In Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans LLC,
16
 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit faced the issue of whether an arbitrator exceeds his powers under the 
FAA by ordering parties to class arbitration—based solely on the use of broad language 
precluding litigation in their contracts.  Dr. John Ivan Sutter and Oxford Health Plans 
LLC (“Oxford”) were parties to a Primary Care Physician Agreement (“agreement”).
17
  
Under the agreement, Sutter agreed to provide primary health care services to members 
of Oxford’s health plan and Oxford agreed to pay Sutter prearranged reimbursement 
rates.
18
  The agreement also contained an arbitration clause that stated:  “No civil action 
concerning any dispute arising under this Agreement shall be instituted before any court, 
and all such disputes shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration in New Jersey, 
pursuant to the Rules of the American Arbitration Association with one arbitrator.”
19
  
                                                 
11
 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1764. 
12
 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1765 (2010) (“Arbitration: Any 
dispute arising from the making, performance or termination of this Charter Party shall be settled in New 
York, Owner and Charterer each appointing an arbitrator, who shall be a merchant, broker or individual 
experienced in the shipping business; the two thus chosen, if they cannot agree, shall nominate a third 
arbitrator who shall be an Admiralty lawyer. Such arbitration shall be conducted in conformity with the 
provisions and procedure of the United States Arbitration Act [the FAA], and a judgment of the Court shall 




 Id. at 1776 (“We think that the differences between bilateral and class-action arbitration are too great 
for arbitrators to presume, consistent with their limited powers under the FAA, that the parties' mere silence 
on the issue of class-action arbitration constitutes consent to resolve their disputes in class proceedings.”). 
15
 Id. at 1775. 
16
 Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans LLC, 675 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2012). 
17
 See id. at 217.  Note that the Primary Care Physician Agreement was drafted by Oxford Health Plans 
LLC. 
18





A dispute arose between the parties when Sutter alleged that Oxford routinely 
improperly denied, underpaid, and delayed reimbursement for services rendered by 
participating physicians.
20
  Accordingly, Sutter filed a complaint with the state court 
alleging breach of contract on behalf of all physicians who were parties to an agreement 
with Oxford.
21
  Based on the agreement’s arbitration clause, Oxford successfully moved 
to compel arbitration of Sutter’s claims.
22
  During arbitration, the arbitrator—upon the 
parties’ request—reviewed the arbitration clause and determined that it allowed for class 
arbitration.
23
  As such, the arbitrator ordered arbitration on a class-wide basis and 
ultimately issued a class award.
24
 
Oxford subsequently moved to vacate the award in the District Court, arguing that 
“the arbitrator had exceeded his powers and manifestly disregarded the law by ordering 
class arbitration”; however, the court denied its motion.
25
  Within three years of the 
District Court’s decision, the Supreme Court decided the Stolt–Nielsen case.
26
  Based on 
the Stolt–Nielsen decision, Oxford appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
27
 
The Third Circuit court began its analysis by recognizing the strong federal policy 
favoring commercial arbitration and pointed out the four narrow grounds for vacatur 
listed in the FAA.
28
  The basis for Oxford’s claim that the class award should be vacated 
was that “the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a 
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.”
29
  
The court conceded that, as held in Stolt-Nielsen, an arbitrator could exceed his powers 
by ordering class arbitration without authorization.
30
  It further explained that the Stolt–
Nielsen established a rule that required a contractual basis for concluding that the parties 
agreed to submit to class arbitration.
31
  The court found that, given the existence of a 
                                                 
20
 See id.  Sutter sought to compel class action litigation against Oxford in the New Jersey Superior 
Court. 
21
 See id. at 217. 
22
 Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans LLC, 675 F.3d 215, 217 (3d Cir. 2012). 
23
 See id. at 218 (“The arbitrator thus determined that the clause's first phrase, ‘No civil action 
concerning any dispute arising under this Agreement shall be instituted before any court,’ embraces all 
conceivable court actions, including class actions. Because the clause's second phrase sends ‘all such 
disputes’ to arbitration, he reasoned that class disputes must also be arbitrated. Thus, the arbitrator 






 Id. at 218 (In Stolt–Nielsen, the Court “held that an arbitral panel had exceeded its authority by 
allowing class arbitration when the parties had reached no agreement on the issue”). 
27
 Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans LLC, 675 F.3d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 2012). 
28
 See id. at 219 (An award may be vacated only upon one of the four narrow grounds enumerated in 
the Federal Arbitration Act: (1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) 
where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the 
arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or 
in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which 
the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so 
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was 










contractual basis, an arbitrator may compel class arbitration under the FAA.
32
  The court 
distinguished this case from Stolt-Nielsen, however, by pointing out that the arbitrators 
for Sutter and Oxford were not constrained by the parties’ intentions regarding class 
arbitration—as had been the case in Stolt-Nielsen.
33
  In Sutter, the arbitrator stated that 
the contractual basis for his decision to compel arbitration was in the first clause of the 
arbitration agreement, which states: “No civil action concerning any dispute arising under 
this Agreement shall be instituted before any court.”
34
  The Third Circuit agreed and 




Ultimately, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision holding that 
the arbitrator did not exceed his powers by construing the arbitration agreement to 
authorize class arbitration.
36
  The Third Circuit noted that Stolt–Nielsen only prohibits an 
arbitrator from inferring parties' consent to class arbitration based on silence in the 
agreement.
37
  According to the court, where the parties' intent regarding class arbitration 




C. A Class By Last Resort: The Reed Case 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently held that an arbitrator 
exceeded his powers
39
 by ordering parties to submit to class arbitration because the 
arbitration agreement failed to state the parties’ intentions regarding the procedure.
40
  In 
Reed v. Florida Metro. Univ., Inc., a dispute arose between Jeffrey Reed and Florida 
Metropolitan University (the “University”) over claims that the University violated 
certain provisions of the Texas Education Code.
41
  Reed graduated from the University’s 
distance learning program, but had accrued $51,000 in debt while attending.
42
  
Unfortunately, Reed later learned that he was precluded from attending law school 
                                                 
32
 Id. at 220. 
33
 See Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans LLC, 675 F.3d 215, 222-23 (3d Cir. 2012) (“No stipulation 
between Oxford and Sutter is conclusive of the parties' intent and, indeed, the parties dispute whether or not 
they intended to authorize class arbitration. Therefore, the arbitrator in this case was not constrained to 
conclude that the parties did not intend to authorize class arbitration. . .”) (emphasis added); see also Stolt-
Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1769-70 (2010). 
34




 Id. at 223. 
37
 Id. at 224. 
38
 See Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans LLC, 675 F.3d 215, 224 (3d Cir. 2012).  The court found, in this 
case, that the powers granted to the arbitrator were sufficiently broad enough to include the authority to 
interpret the agreement and compel class arbitration. 
39
 Reed v. Florida Metro. Univ., Inc., 681 F.3d 630, 644 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he arbitrator lacked a 
contractual basis upon which to conclude that the parties agreed to authorize class arbitration. At most, the 
agreement in this case could support a finding that the parties did not preclude class arbitration, but under 
Stolt–Nielsen this is not enough. The arbitrator therefore exceeded his authority in ordering the parties to 
submit to a class arbitration proceeding, and the district court should have vacated the award”). 
40
 Id. at 644 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4)).  
41





because his bachelor’s degree was not accepted by educational institutions and 
employers.
43
  Thereafter, Reed filed a class action suit—on behalf of every Texas 
resident who contracted to receive distance education from the University—claiming that 




The University moved to compel individual arbitration pursuant to the arbitration 
clause in its enrollment agreement.
45
  Yet, during arbitration, the arbitrator allowed for 
class arbitration.
46
  The issue presented to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was whether 




The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by recognizing the guidance provided by the 
U.S. Supreme Court regarding class arbitration in the Stolt-Nielson and Concepcion
48
 
decisions.  The Fifth Circuit found that these Supreme Court cases highlighted the 
significant disadvantages of class arbitration.
49
  In light of this, the court held that an 
arbitrator should not conclude that parties consented to such a proceeding absent a 
contractual basis for doing so;
50
 and that in the absence of a contractual basis, the 
arbitrator should look to the FAA or state law to see if it allows for class arbitration.
51
  
The court concluded that nothing in the enrollment agreement provided the arbitrator 
with a contractual basis for compelling class arbitration;
52
 and therefore, the arbitrator 
should have consulted state or federal law to see if a rule existed which addressed class 
arbitration. 
53
  The court determined that his failure to do so and to rely merely on his 
interpretation of the arbitration clause is where he exceeded his powers.
54
  The Fifth 
Circuit noted that Stolt–Nielsen held that “arbitrators should not ‘presume . . . that the 
parties' mere silence . . . constitutes consent’ to class arbitration.”
55
  Accordingly, 




 Reed v. Florida Metro. Univ., Inc., 681 F.3d 630, 632 (5th Cir. 2012). 
45
 See id. at 632 (“Terms of Arbitration: 1) Both student and Everest University irrevocably agree that 
any dispute between them shall be submitted to Arbitration. 2) Neither the student nor Everest University 
shall file or maintain any lawsuit in any court against the other, and agree that any suit filed in violation of 
this Agreement shall be dismissed by the court in favor of an arbitration conducted pursuant to this 
Agreement. . . . 4) The arbitrator's decision shall be set forth in writing and shall set forth the essential 
findings and conclusions upon which the decision is based. 5) Any remedy available from a court under the 
law shall be available in the arbitration.”). 
46




 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).  The U.S. Supreme Court held that 
the FAA preempts California's judicial rule regarding the unconscionability of class arbitration waivers in 
consumer contracts.  This decision effectively legitimized the use of class actions waivers in all commercial 
arbitration agreements. 
49




 Id. at 641. 
52




 Reed v. Florida Metro. Univ., Inc., 681 F.3d 630, 642 (5th Cir. 2012). 
55
 See id.; see also Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010) (“We 
think that the differences between bilateral and class-action arbitration are too great for arbitrators to 
presume, consistent with their limited powers under the FAA, that the parties' mere silence on the issue of 
class-action arbitration constitutes consent to resolve their disputes in class proceedings.”). 
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arbitrators should only compel class arbitration if they are granted the powers to by 
contract or law. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Brewing Silence Preceding Stolt-Nielsen 
Prior to Stolt-Nielsen, arbitrators would often order class arbitration when an 
arbitration agreement was silent on the issue, and courts would generally affirm 
arbitrators’ decisions.
56
  Although this outcome was usually contrary to business 
interests, businesses did not prohibit class action arbitration because class action waivers 
were generally held as unconscionable and unenforceable.
57
  As such, many arbitration 
agreements remained silent on the issue of class actions.
58
  The Stolt-Nielsen decision 
was revolutionary insofar as it provided some guidance for lower courts and businesses 
with respect to the functionality and applicability of class arbitration.
59
  Yet, the Court’s 
reliance on “contractual basis” for a class arbitration determination left unclear whether 
that contractual basis always had to be expressly written into the contract language.
60
  For 
arbitrators, the uncertainty regarding what constitutes “contractual basis” has provided 
space for arbitral interpretation regarding the parties’ intentions to submit to class 
arbitration.  As a result, lower courts have been left with the task of deciding whether 
sufficient contractual basis exists to authorize arbitral interpretations.
61
  In making these 
decisions, lower courts must often reckon with the U.S. Supreme Court’s clear distaste 





                                                 
56
 See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (The U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
arbitration clause did not preclude class arbitration, therefore the FAA did not foreclose class arbitration); 
Cable Connection, Inc. v. DirectTV, Inc., 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 187 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 2006), rev'd, 82 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 229 (Cal. 2008) (holding that the arbitrators did not exceed power by permitting classwide arbitration); 
Dealer Computer Servs., Inc. v. Dub Herring Ford, 623 F.3d 348 (6th Cir. 2006) (the court held that the 
arbitral panel's decision to allow class action arbitration was not ripe for judicial review). 
57
 See Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act and the Supreme 
Court's Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 482 (2011). 
58
 See id. 
59
 See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775 (holding that parties may not be compelled to submit to class 
arbitration under the FAA, unless a contractual basis could be provided to justify a conclusion that the 
parties agreed to the procedure). 
60
 Jay W. Waks & Carlos L. Lopez, Stolt-Nielsen, Silence and Class Arbitration: "Same As It Ever 
Was," 29 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 193, 206 (2011) (“It noted only that express language 
referring to class arbitration was not always required but that ‘[a]n implicit agreement to authorize class-
action arbitration . . . is not a term that the arbitrator may infer solely from the fact of the parties' agreement 
to arbitrate.’”). 
61
 See generally Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., 646 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
1742, 182 L. Ed. 2d 529 (2012); Reed v. Florida Metro. Univ., Inc., 681 F.3d 630 (5th Cir. 2012); Sutter v. 
Oxford Health Plans LLC, 675 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2012). 
62
 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010); see also AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). In Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion, the majority expressed 
disdain for the class action arbitration process; even characterizing it as unfair for defendants.  
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B. Split Circuits Amid A Mute Chorus  
 
A number of circuit courts—in particular the Third and Fifth Circuits—have 
interpreted and applied the Stolt-Nielsen decision in very different ways.
63
  In Sutter, 
Third Circuit Judge Fuentes’ opinion emphasized that a default rule was established by 
Stolt–Nielsen, which provided that a contractual basis was required for concluding that 
the party agreed to class arbitration.
64
  By relying solely on the contractual basis as the 
rule, the court ultimately deferred to the arbitrator’s professional judgment.  The court 
stated that “[w]ithout a conclusive statement of the parties' intent or clear evidence of 
arbitral overreaching, we must conclude that the arbitrator performed his duty 
appropriately and endeavored to give effect to the parties' intent.”
65
  In light of the court’s 
deference, the arbitrator’s explanation that the contractual basis rested in the broad 
language of the arbitration clause was readily affirmed by the court.
66
  The Sutter court 
also concluded that the arbitrator’s decision to order class arbitration was in line with 
public policy.
67
  In sum, the Sutter court’s reliance on contractual terms and, to a lesser 
extent, public policy led the majority to determine that the arbitrator possessed the power 
to compel class arbitration where the arbitration clause was written broadly. 
Conversely, the Reed court interpreted Stolt–Nielsen as not only requiring a 
contractual basis for ordering class arbitration, but also identifying the governing rule of 
law and following the procedure that it prescribed.
68
  The Reed majority explained that 
the primary mishap in Stolt–Nielsen was that, in the absence of the parties’ consent, the 
arbitrators developed and ordered what they viewed as the best approach for the 
situation.
69
  In light of the Reed court’s interpretation, it was very reluctant to defer to the 
best professional judgment of arbitrators.  Moreover, the court emphasized the 
importance of following statutory prescriptions rather than baseless arbitral’ 
determinations.
70
   
                                                 
63
 American Arbitration Association, U.S. Courts of Appeal Are Split on the Interpretation of Stolt-
Nielsen on Class Actions, 67-JUL DISP. RESOL. J. 4 (2012) (“The Reed, Jock and Sutter decisions 
demonstrate three differing interpretations regarding the analysis and standards that arbitrators must follow 
when determining whether an arbitration clause permits classwide arbitration proceedings”).  
64
 Sutter, 675 F.3d at 222. 
65
 See id. at 224 (showing clear deference to the arbitrator and placing the burden on the Appellant—
Oxford Health Plans, LLC—to provide evidence suggesting that the arbitrator did not performed his duties 
appropriately).  
66
 Id. (finding that the appellant’s allegations were “simply dressed-up arguments that the arbitrator 
interpreted its agreement erroneously”). 
67
 Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans LLC, 675 F.3d 215, 233 (3d Cir. 2012) (excepting appellees argument 
that individual arbitration was contrary to New Jersey public policy). 
68
 Reed v. Florida Metro. Univ., Inc., 681 F.3d 630, 638 (5th Cir. 2012).  The governing laws were 
presumed to be either the FAA or state law. 
69
 Id. at 638-39 (stating that “instead of ‘inquiring whether the FAA, maritime law, or New York law 
contains a ‘default rule’ under which an arbitration clause is construed as allowing class arbitration in the 
absence of express consent, the panel proceeded as if it had the authority of a common-law court to develop 
what it viewed as the best rule to be applied in such a situation.’ The arbitrators perceived a consensus 
favoring class arbitration, and considered only whether there was a ‘good reason not to follow that 
consensus.’ Finding no such reason, the arbitration panel determined that the parties' agreement permitted 
class arbitration.”). 
70
 Id. at 638 (explaining that “the arbitrator should have consulted state or federal law to determine if a 
certain “default” class arbitration rule existed in the absence of an agreement.”). 
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 The rigidity of the Reed court’s interpretation of Stolt–Nielsen serves as a 
significant weakness to the arbitral process.  By leaving no room for arbitral 
interpretation, arbitrators’ hands are tied because they lack the requisite authority to use 
their professional judgment to determine the parties’ intent.  For instance, in one case a 
contract between two contractors contained an arbitration provision that established that 
“any dispute[] between them would be resolved by binding arbitration .”
71
  Theoretically, 
one party to the contract could argue that the issue of class arbitration is not agreed upon 
because it is contained within the four corners of the contract. Under a strict application 
of Reed, an arbitrator lacks the authority to determine the scope of this plainly stated 
arbitration provision, which could potentially render the entire American arbitration 
system ineffective and nonsensical.  Moreover, under Reed, it seems that whenever a 
party to an arbitration agreement successfully claims that party intent is unclear, the 
judiciary could be called upon to render a final decision on the matter.  This sort of broad 
judicial intervention is contrary to the purpose of the FAA
72
 and the spirit of the 
American arbitration system.
73
   
 Ideally, parties agree to submit their disputes to arbitration and entrust arbitrators 
with the authority to render just decisions in an efficient manner.  The Sutter court’s 
interpretation of Stolt–Nielsen more closely follows the spirit of the FAA by deferring to 
arbitrators’ professional judgment.  The Sutter court’s deference to arbitrator judgment 
enhances the legitimacy of arbitration and reduces the tendency of judicial intervention.  
In a recent First Circuit case, the court adopted the Sutter decision and applied it to a 
commercial arbitration dispute.
74
  In that case, the arbitration agreement between a 
franchisor and franchisees did not expressly authorize class arbitration, yet the First 
Circuit Court rejected the argument “that there must be express contractual language 
evincing the parties' intent to permit class or collective arbitration.”
75
  The Court 
reasoned that no bright-line rule was created by Stolt-Nielson that required the words 
“class arbitration” to be written into every agreement in order for parties to use the 
procedure.
76
  To require parties to specifically state each and every term that they are 
agreeing to—in spite of language indicating that all disputes must go to arbitration—
would turn the formation of arbitration agreements into an extremely arduous process.  In 
the spirit of the FAA, courts should follow the precedent set by the Sutter court and 




                                                 
71
 Hofer Builders, Inc. v. Capstone Bldg. Corp., CIV.A. 12-1367, 2012 WL 5877986 (E.D. La. Nov. 
20, 2012). 
72
 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (“The ‘principal purpose’ of the 
FAA is to ‘ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.’”). 
73
 See Int'l Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Indus. Y Comercial, 745 F. 
Supp. 172, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“The whole point of arbitration is that the merits of the dispute will not be 
reviewed in the courts, wherever they be located. Indeed, this principle is so deeply imbedded in American, 
and specifically, federal jurisprudence, that no further elaboration of the case law is necessary.”).  
74
 See generally Fantastic Sams Franchise Corp. v. FSRO Ass'n Ltd., 683 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2012). 
75






Because arbitration is an alternate form of adjudication, arbitrators require the 
authority to rule on matters submitted to arbitration without judicial intervention or 
second-guessing.  Determining whether an arbitration agreement empowers an arbitrator 
to compel class arbitration, where party intent is not explicitly stated, should rightfully be 
decided by the arbitrator.  Otherwise, more cases will be submitted to the judiciary for 
final adjudication, which is directly in opposition of the FAA’s purpose.  The Third 
Circuit’s application of Stolt-Nielsen empowers the arbitral process and stimulates growth 
of alternative dispute resolution processes.  In no instance should the judiciary infringe on 
an arbitrators’ domain and ability to effectively conduct arbitration proceedings.  
Therefore, because the Third Circuit's interpretation gives deference to arbitrators’ 
professional judgment, is in line with the FAA’s purpose, and adds legitimacy to the 
arbitral process, it is the more appropriate approach that should be followed by the 
judiciary. 
 
 
 
